{
    "case_number": "CAC-ADREU-004560",
    "time_of_filling": null,
    "domain_names": [],
    "case_administrator": null,
    "complainant": [],
    "complainant_representative": null,
    "respondent": [],
    "respondent_representative": null,
    "factual_background": "In this proceeding, the Complainant is My Home Limited, a company incorproated in Ireland, the Respondent is My Home SA, a company incorporated in Luxembourg, and the disputed domain name is \"myhome.eu\". In addition the Complainant is known by its trade mark and domain name, \"myhome.ie\". For ease of reference therefore, references to the parties may include their place of incorporation or \"nationality\".\r\n\r\nMyhome.eu was registered to the Respondent during the second part of phased (or \"sunrise\") registration as provided for by the Regulation 874\/2004 laying down public policy rules concerning the implementation and functions of the .eu Top Level Domain and the principles governing registration (\"the .eu Regulation\"). \r\n\r\nSeparately, the Complainant had made two successive applications during the Sunrise period, but these were declined on the grounds of administrative deficiency. No administrative or other proceedings were initiated against the Registry with regard to registration.\r\n\r\nAfter the Complaint and Responses were filed, the Complainant sought and was granted leave to file a Rejoinder. Thereafter, the Respondent sought and was granted leave to file a Further Response, with the Complaint offered a further opportunity to reply.\r\n\r\nThis dispute turns on points of fact, upon which I, as the Panel, have to make findings, and on interpretation of the .eu Regulation.",
    "other_legal_proceedings": "The Panel is not aware of any other legal proceedings that are pending or decided and which relate to the disputed domain name.",
    "discussion_and_findings": "1. Introduction\r\n\r\nIn this proceeding, an Irish limited company, an Irish trade mark, a Luxemburgish société anonyme and a .eu domain name have been created with an identical stem, namely “myhome”. Each is written in unbroken script, and each purports to be the brand name of services provided in relation to property. Furthermore, each is recognized as valid within the jurisdiction that enabled it to be registered or incorporated. The two companies, MyHome Ltd, and MyHome SA now dispute the others rights to register the .eu domain, myhome.eu.\r\n\r\nThe parties, in detailed written submissions that, on printing, stretch towards one hundred fifty pages, have raised numerous issues of fact and law. In this regard, I have deliberately set out the parties’ respective arguments in detail. I intend to reach findings on as many issues as affect my final decision. Where no finding is offered in relation to an allegation, submission or fact, then this can be treated as not being cogent to my final analysis.\r\n\r\nThe nature of this dispute, and the allegations raised, has meant making certain findings of fact. In making these findings I am reminded of the burden and standard of proof; the burden being on the party that asserts to the civil standard of the balance of probabilities. Where, in relation to a certain fact asserted, a prima face case is proven then the onus shifts to the other party to rebut, again to the same civil standard.\r\n\r\nWith regard to points of law, I have been referred to several decisions of administrative panels, and where necessary I will adopt or distinguish the precedent that the relevant decision sets.\r\n\r\n\r\n2. Admissibility\r\n\r\nAccording to Article 21 of the .eu Regulation:\r\n\r\n\"A registered domain name shall be subject to revocation, using an appropriate extra-judicial or judicial procedure, where that name is identical or confusingly similar to a name in respect of which a right is recognised or established by national and\/or Community law, such as the rights mentioned in Article 10(1), and where it:\r\n(a) has been registered by its holder without rights or legitimate interest in the name; or\r\n(b) has been registered or is being used in bad faith.\"\r\n\r\nIt falls on the Complainant to establish the constituent elements of this provision before I can revoke a registration, and consequently transfer it away from the Respondent Registrant.\r\n\r\nThe Complainant relies upon its registered trade mark as the basis of rights to the make this Complaint. That mark is semi-figurative in the name and style of MYHOME.IE.  I am aware of the notoriety of the trade mark and of the website portal to which it relates. Even if I were not, the claims of notoriety made by the Complainant are not challenged by the Respondent and so I would be bound to accept them in any event.\r\n\r\nI have inspected the copy trade mark certificate and find that the Complainant has a valid and enforceable trademark, created by law. The Complainant submits that its trade mark is a “prior right” pursuant to Article 10(1) .eu Regulation, and whilst I recognize that technically that is correct the categorisation of such rights relates only to period of phased registration. \r\n\r\nHowever, I find, with little effort required to do so, that the trade mark and the disputed domain name are identical or similar. In this regard, the Respondent argues that the suffix “.ie” in the trade mark should be sufficient to render the trade mark and disputed domain name (which of course includes a different extension) as non-identical, but I am not persuaded by that the Respondent’s fairly extensive submission. Rather, the Complainant cites authority that I acknowledge as correct: this being that a top level domain extension is not material for the purposes of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar. With such a finding, the Respondent will doubtless be unsurprised to note that I cannot accept that there is any basis for finding that the trade mark and disputed domain name are not confusingly similar.\r\n\r\nFinally, I find I cannot draw any adverse inference from the fact that the Complainant’s original application for the disputed domain name during the Sunrise period was declined. Contrary to the Respondent’s submission I do not agree that this suggests an absence of rights to a domain name. Even if I should imply a negative connotation, the Complainant has nevertheless produced in this proceeding a valid and enforceable trade mark evidencing rights in principle to the disputed domain name.\r\n\r\nSo in my view this proceeding turns on whether the Respondent has any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and if it has, whether nevertheless the disputed domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.\r\n\r\n\r\n3. Legitimate Interests\r\n\r\nExamples of legitimate interest are set out in the .eu Regulation (Article 21(2)), and thus they include:\r\n\r\n(a) prior to any notice of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure, the holder of a domain name has used the domain name or a name corresponding to the domain name in connection with the offering of goods or services or has made demonstrable preparation to do so;\r\n\r\n(b) the holder of a domain name, being an undertaking, organization or natural person, has been commonly known by the domain name, even in the absence of a right recognized or established by national and\/or Community law;\r\n\r\n(c) the holder of a domain name is making a legitimate and non-commercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent to mislead consumers or harm the reputation of a name on which a right is recognised or established by national and\/or Community law.\r\n\r\nThe Complainant alleges that none of the foregoing examples apply, that is to say: the domain name has not be used or prepared demonstrably to be used in connection with an offering of goods and services; the Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name; and, it is not making legitimate use without intent to mislead consumers etc.\r\n\r\nI find that the Complainant, which had the harder task of proving an absence of interest (and for this reason was allowed file a rejoinder in reply to the Response), established a prima facie case, and this regard I took into account the Respondent’s apparent willingness to sell the domain name to someone, like the Complainant, with an interest and the fact that the domain name was being used to host a website with links competing with the Complainant’s business. \r\n\r\nHowever, having considered one point not expressly dealt with by either parties, as well as the Respondent’s explanations, I find on balance, and for several reasons, that it does possess a legitimate interest in the domain name. \r\n\r\nFirst and foremost, it cannot escape a Panel’s attention that the disputed domain name was registered to the Respondent during the Sunrise period of registration, and that there has been no subsequent and material changes to the registration. Unlike the land-rush and subsequent periods in the life of a general Top Level Domain, applications during the Sunrise period are subject to prior scrutiny. As stated in Article 10 (1), to succeed in the period of phased registration an applicant must establish “prior rights” that are supported by relevant documentation. These rights include business identifiers and company names in so far as they are protected under national law in the Member-State.\r\n\r\nThe Respondent relied upon its company name, and according to the Sunrise rules company names registered in Luxemburg are eligible to be relied upon as a protected prior right during Phase 2. In this regard, the company name is identical or similar to the disputed domain name, and as the name was subsequently granted I find I have to assume that the Respondent produced adequate documentary evidence in support. \r\n\r\nThus I find that if a company name can form the basis of a proven and acknowledged prior right, only if there is overwhelming evidence, proving that the original registration was in error, could a Panel find, in the absence of a renewal or any material changes to the registration, that the same company name cannot form the basis of a legitimate interest in a subsequent administrative proceeding, brought by a third party.\r\n\r\nEven if I were not to accept the mere, uncorroborated fact of registration during the Sunrise period as a sufficient legitimate interest, I find in any event that the Respondent has adequately proven a legitimate interest by adducing extracts from the company and trade name registers showing a similarity between the domain name and its own protected name.\r\n\r\nSecondly, I am not persuaded that this is a case in which a company has been incorporated with the sole purpose of registering a domain name. Whilst there has been little or no demonstrable activity in relation to the domain name, that is, myhome.eu, a name corresponding to the domain name, that is MyHome SA, has been used to form a company, acquire assets and rent property Of course, with the company and domain name stems being identical, this distinction is probably semantic, but my finding is that even in the absence of significant use of the domain name, there is a corresponding and identical name that has been used. And according to Article 21(2)(a) use of, or demonstrable preparation to use, a corresponding name can constitute prior use.\r\n\r\nThirdly, I am not convinced by the Complainant’s arguments that the company has not been commonly known by its domain name, when the company and domain name stems are identical. The argument is novel, and in one sense correct, since the Respondent is not known by the full domain name including extension, as is the Complainant for instance. Yet, the Complainant cites elsewhere for its own purposes that in comparisons between domain names and other business identifiers, TLD extensions can be ignored.\r\n\r\nAs regards the final example (fair use), the Complainant makes a strong argument that the use was not fair. As indicated above, I found the evidence produced of possible cyber-squatting was sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Unfortunately, as I have already found the basis for a legitimate interest on the part of the Respondent, it does not fall to consider under this head of claim whether the Respondent’s explanations are acceptable. The examples cited in Article 21(2) are scenarios that suggest the existence of a legitimate interest, and they are not cumulative or selective conditions which can negate a legitimate interest. For example, if a holder can show that he is making legitimate fair use of a domain name (without intention to mislead consumers) it would be inappropriate to negate that interest if equally it can be shown that the holder has not been commonly known by the domain name.\r\n\r\nInstead, I find that the allegations of intention to sell and commercial gain are more properly dealt with under the heading of bad faith.\r\n\r\nAccordingly I find that the Complainant has not shown that the disputed domain name has been registered by its holder without rights or legitimate interest in the name.\r\n\r\n\r\n4. Bad Faith\r\n\r\nBad faith is described in Article 21 .eu Regulation by reference to examples, these being:\r\n\r\n(a) circumstances indicate that the domain name was registered or acquired primarily for the purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name to the holder of a\r\nname in respect of which a right is recognised or established by national and\/or Community law or to a public body; or\r\n\r\n(b) the domain name has been registered in order to prevent the holder of such a name in respect of which a right is recognised or established by national and\/or Community law, or a public body, from reflecting this name in a corresponding domain name, provided that: \r\n(i) a pattern of such conduct by the registrant can be demonstrated; or\r\n(ii) the domain name has not been used in a relevant way for at least two years from the date of registration; or \r\n(iii) in circumstances where, at the time the ADR procedure was initiated, the holder of a domain name in respect of which a right is recognised or established by national and\/or Community law or the holder of a domain name of a public body has declared his\/its intention to use the domain name in a relevant way but fails to do so within six months of the day on which the ADR procedure was initiated;\r\n\r\n(c) the domain name was registered primarily for the purpose of disrupting the professional activities of a competitor; or\r\n\r\n(d) the domain name was intentionally used to attract Internet users, for commercial gain, to the holder of a domain name website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with a name on which a right is recognised or established by national and\/or Community law or a name of a public body, such likelihood arising as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of the website or location or of a product or service on the website or location\r\nof the holder of a domain name; or\r\n\r\n(e) the domain name registered is a personal name for which no demonstrable link exists between the domain name holder and the domain name registered.\r\n\r\nThe Complainant contends that each (except the last) of the foregoing can apply in the present case, but I find that only two require serious consideration. Scenario (c) is not adequately made out in the Complain and would, in my opinion, require something more that what has been shown to have occurred – namely the linking to third party sites (which constitutes a potential commercial gain under Scenario (d)).\r\n\r\nAs for Scenario (b), I find that neither the principal nor the proviso relied upon (pattern of conduct) are made out, despite the arguments put forward. Admittedly, the Respondent’s circumstances – consisting of a new company formed shortly before application with little subsequent demonstrable use of the disputed domain name – suggest that possibly the Respondent intended to deprive the Complainant of use of the disputed domain name, but ultimately on the balance of probabilities I am not persuaded by this. For the reasons set out below with regard to the two scenarios examined in detail I do not find that the domain name was, at the time, registered to deprive the Complainant, or someone like it, of the disputed domain name. Furthermore, pattern of conduct is usually proven by the registration of a number (at least several) different domain names, rather than a respondent’s conduct in relation to one domain. Even if I was to accept argument in relation to the latter, the pattern of conduct evidenced by the exchange of emails and telephone calls is at best equivocal. On the one hand, it might be evidence of a cyber-squatter at work; on the other hand, it might be evidence of the genuine response to a genuine offer. Of the two, I do not have a reason disbelieve the latter.\r\n\r\nThis leaves bad faith characterized by the intention of selling and bad faith characterized by intention to attract Internet users, as relevant to my decision, both of which turn on issues of fact.\r\n\r\n\r\n5. The domain name was registered or acquired primarily for the purpose of selling\r\n\r\nIn support of its contention, the Complainant recites at length the email and telephone exchanges between itself and the Respondent. This was, in effect, a period of negotiation, since a definite offer to purchase, as well as an implied invitation to treat, is in evidence.\r\n\r\nAccording to the Complainant, the fact that the Respondent entertained its interests, considered its offer, and invited further interest in the future demonstrates sufficient intention to sell if the price was right. If one factors in the less than substantial evidence of use of the disputed domain name, then one can conclude, as the Panel finds, that there is a prima facie case that the domain name was registered primarily for the purpose of selling. It is not a strong case as the evidence is not clear that this was the primary purpose, but it is certainly suggestive.\r\n\r\nThus the matter turns on the credibility of the Respondent’s explanation for the chain of events. In its defence it states that it did not seek out the Complainant, but responded to the latter’s advances. It points out that, in the end, it did not sell, agree or promise to sell, or make counteroffers on a price; nor has it sought out offers from other potential buyers. \r\n\r\nHowever, the Respondent did consider the offer made, it did suggest that a transfer would be considered and might occur, and it did appear to hold out the prospect of selling at a later date. In addition, it stated early on in the exchange of correspondence that it has put “considerable effort into the website, documentation and log” (and later it refers to a draft website) but has not produced any evidence to support this statement. The only evidence adduced relates to the purchase and lease of premises.\r\n\r\nThese viewpoints are evenly balanced, and so to determine where truth lies, I am minded to apply the line of reasoning adopted by the Panel in Think Service, Inc. v. Juan Carlos aka Juan Carlos Linardi WIPO Case No. D2005-1033 (which itself relies upon Emilio Pucci SRL v.Mailbank.com Inc., WIPO Case D2000-1786 and Builder’s Best Inc. v. Yoshiki Okada, WIPO Case No. D2004-0748) which runs:\r\n\r\nthe relevant bad faith must be specific to the Complainant, or at very least that the Respondent must have “had the Complainant in mind” when he registered the Domain Name.\r\n\r\nBy doing so I find that I cannot on the balance of probabilities conclude that the Respondent’s primary intention, at the time the domain was registered, was to sell the disputed domain. The ordinary and natural meaning of “primary” is foremost, of first rank of importance or value. This implies that there is no other overriding or principal purpose or intention. From the evidence before me, the Respondent had a business plan of supplying property or business related services. It executed this plan, not simply by registering a domain name, but first of all incorporating a company in a name and style that was consistent with the original objective, and later managing the company to acquire assets in its name, and exploiting those assets. The worst that can be said against the Respondent is that it is a small enterprise that has been slow, even very slow, to role out its profile on the Internet through use of the disputed domain name, and that momentarily it considered an offer to purchase the domain name. I find that these reasons cannot support a finding that the Respondent registered the disputed domain name with the primary intention of selling it to someone like the Complainant.\r\n\r\nIn Think Service, Inc. the Panel’s found there was no evidence that the Respondent was even aware of the Complainant or its trade mark when he registered the Domain Name. In my view, a similar set of circumstances are in evidence in the present proceeding.\r\n\r\n\r\n6. Intention to attract Internet users for commercial gain\r\n\r\nIn support of this final scenario, the Complainant produced in evidence screen shots of the website that resolved to the disputed domain name for a period prior to commencement of this administrative proceeding. The page was subsequently replaced by a re-direction to the website of a company trading in the name of a-syst.com. According to the Respondent this latter company is a sister to the Respondent, in that it is under common ownership.\r\n\r\nI find that there is a prima facie case establishing bad faith on this occasion since it is evident that the page contains links to websites that compete with the business of the Complainant, even if one link is to the Complainant’s own website.\r\n\r\nIn its defence, the Respondent explains that the page in question was a parking page; that is, one which is put in place to host a domain that is not otherwise put to use. It claims that it was not responsible for content at this stage, as its own website was not ready (or prepared) to go live, but rather that it was the responsibility of its Registrar. According to a letter from the Registrar and produced in evidence by the Respondent, the Registrar had deferred responsibility to a third party whose business is to post content on empty websites; and according to the Registrar’s explanation the third party generates content by inserting links in turn generated by the a Internet search engine. Apparently, the purpose of the chain of delegation is to avoid the domain name resolving to an error message.\r\n\r\nThe question is whether this convoluted explanation that it is all an accident of circumstance is credible. There is then the question as to whether I should accept it.\r\n\r\nRegarding credibility, the explanation is not an exceptional one to make or justify since any informed and regular Internet user will be aware that it is the common practice in the domain hosting and registrar business to park underdeveloped domain names and to generate content based on de facto relevancy of names and words. Against this, the thrust of the Complainant arguments forces the simple and valid point that the inclusion of links to competing sites on an otherwise inactive website suggests the pursuit of commercial gain. In this regard it is, admittedly, also common practice for cyber-squatters to use the same technique to generate income. \r\n\r\nThe matter is once again evenly balanced. In my view an answer lies in the screen shot provided by the Complainant.  The title is described as “Myhome.eu – the Best my home Resources and Information.” In my analysis, this does not sufficiently imply bad faith as, other than the inclusion of the words “my home”, the “best resources and information” is, in the opinion of this Panel, a claim frequently made on the Internet.  \r\n\r\nWithin the body of the page, the domain name is repeated along side a web-search box; this possibly generates sponsored links to the key words entered. In a separate box there are some further links, again possibly to sponsored web links. But in the main body there are some hypertext links, which in the current example includes re-directions to the Complainant’s web page and one belonging to a third party. The Respondent suggests that possibly the Complainant’s web page appears because the Complainant does pay for its links to be inserted as a sponsored link.  This may or may not be true, so I reach no conclusion in this regard.\r\n\r\nFinally, there is the URL at the foot of the screen shot, which indicates the location of the page actually being viewed. This last component is most informative since it reveals that the web page was being hosted under the domain name, sedoparking.com. This corresponds to the Respondent’s evidence that, according to information supplied by its own Registrar (EuroDNS), content for the web page was supplied by Sedo.com.\r\n\r\nThus I find that there is some acceptable corroboration for the Respondent’s explanation. And I find further support for its position on other points that undermine a credible connection being made between the sponsored links displayed on the parked page and the alleged intention on the part of the Respondent to attract Internet users for commercial gain: for instance, it is a very credible that the links were generated automatically and outside its control, or that links other than those relating to Irish property sites might be generated at any time; secondly, one also has to consider that an Internet search when physically located in Ireland might produce different results to a search conducted when physically located in Luxemburg or elsewhere; thirdly, if the Respondent was making a commercial gain from maintaining an Irish property portal, then is one to assume it made a commercial gain from inclusion of the Complainant’s website?; fourthly, with only one known domain (and no suggestion of any others) the estimated income is likely to be very negligible, if it exists at all; fifthly, it would be wrong to assume in the absence of cogent evident that the Respondent was profiting from the sponsored links; finally, which ever of the foregoing apply, an Internet-based business like the Complainant would have to produce very substantial evidence that it has not at some point, either intentionally or inadvertently, agreed to or failed to adequately opt out of, its domain name being used as a sponsored link on a parked page like the one resolving to the disputed domain name.\r\n\r\nEach of these observations strengthens the credibility of the Respondent’s explanation in my view. Moreover, I also take into consideration that the Respondent subsequently re-directed the domain to its sister company’s site. Whilst the Complainant has argued that this indicates to a lack of use of the domain name, it also serves to demonstrate that action was taken in a reasonable period of time, to bring to a halt a practice that the Complainant complains of. In this regard, I do not find that it is a thinly-veiled attempt to disguise a legitimate interest or conceal bad faith. \r\n\r\nAs to whether I can accept the explanation, the Complainant, in its Rejoinder, robustly submits that I cannot: the Respondent, it states, must be held accountable for content on web pages that resolve to a domain name under its control. It points out that contractually between Registrar (EuroDNS) and Registrant, the Respondent is bound to have notice of content. Moreover, the Complainant argues that “… the entire ADR system is predicated on the basis that the Registrant (who is referred to as the “Respondent” in the ADR Rules) is the person ultimately responsible for what appears on its domain name. It concludes, forcefully, that to allow a Respondent the defence of ignorance and thus abdicate its responsibility would bring the whole ADR system into disrepute.\r\n\r\nI agree that if respondents are not adequately held in check for their actions then this would undermine the value of the ADR system of remedies for domain disputes. However, the operative word employed in the bad faith case in issue is intentionally. The case is only made out if the domain name was “intentionally” used to attract Internet users, for commercial gain, etc. One might therefore argue that the standard of intention required is specific intention, since the case does not allow expressly allow for recklessness. If this was the case, successful complaints will be rare events. On the other hand, the case speaks of the “creating a likelihood of confusion”, which conveys that something less than specific intention is required. In any event, since evidence of some actual or apparent intention is required, as a matter of interpretation therefore, I find that the case does not impose a standard of strict liability, which would follow if the Complainant’s line was adopted. And I am not aware of any authority, whether from a judicial or extra-judicial source, stating that bad faith is a torts of strict liability, rather it implies a mental element.\r\n\r\nThus, I find I need to consider if the Respondent intended to attract Internet users intentionally, for commercial gain, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s enforceable rights in law. Two of these components are already made out: there is a likelihood of confusion between the Complainant’s name and online presence and the Respondent’s name and putative online presence. Moreover, the website produced by the Complainant does display third party links. However, and in the final analysis, taking into account the matters raised herein, I find the Respondent’s explanations are plausible. Thus, on the balance of probabilities I cannot find that the domain was or is being used with the intention of attracting users for commercial gain.\r\n\r\n\r\n7. Conclusion\r\n\r\nIn conclusion, and after careful evaluation of the facts, I find that the Complainant has not proven its case. As much as it appears on first impression that the the disputed domain name has been registered to a registrant whose primary interest was pecuniary or commercial gain, on inspection I find innocent and acceptable explanations for the events and facts that were suspicious.",
    "decision": "For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with Paragraphs B12 (b) and (c) of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Complaint is Denied",
    "panelists": [
        null
    ],
    "date_of_panel_decision": "2007-10-02 00:00:00",
    "informal_english_translation": "In this proceeding, an Irish limited company, an Irish trade mark, a Luxemburgish société anonyme and a .eu domain name have been created with an identical stem, namely “myhome”. Each is written in unbroken script, and each purports to be the brand name of services provided in relation to property. Furthermore, each is recognized as valid within the jurisdiction that enabled it to be registered or incorporated. The two companies, MyHome Ltd, and MyHome SA now dispute the others rights to register the .eu domain, myhome.eu.\r\n\r\nThis proceeding turns on whether the Respondent has any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, and if it has, whether nevertheless the disputed domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.\r\n\r\nRegarding legitimate interest, I find on balance, and for several reasons, that it does possess a legitimate interest in the domain name. \r\n\r\nFirst and foremost, it cannot escape a Panel’s attention that the disputed domain name was registered to the Respondent during the Sunrise period of registration, and that there has been no subsequent and material changes to the registration. Secondly, this is not a case in which a company has been incorporated with the sole purpose of registering a domain name. Thirdly, the company has been commonly known by its domain name, since the company and domain name stems are identical. As regards fair use, the Complainant makes a strong argument that the use was not fair. Unfortunately, as I have already found the basis for a legitimate interest on the part of the Respondent, it does not fall to consider under this head of claim whether the Respondent’s explanations are acceptable.\r\n\r\nRegarding bad faith, I find that none of the cases of bad faith are made out.\r\n\r\nIn particular Scenario (b) is not made out for the reasons set out in relation to the other bad faith cases discussed Furthermore, pattern of conduct is usually proven by the registration of a number (at least several) different domain names, rather than a respondent’s conduct in relation to one domain. \r\n\r\nIn support of its contention that the Respondent intended to sell the domain name, the Complainant relies on the email and telephone exchanges between itself and the Respondent. \r\nIt is not a strong case as the evidence is not clear that selling was the primary purpose, but it is certainly suggestive.\r\n\r\nThe matter turns on the credibility of the Respondent’s explanation. I am minded to apply the line of reasoning adopted by the Panel in Think Service, Inc. v. Juan Carlos aka Juan Carlos Linardi WIPO Case No. D2005-1033 which runs the relevant bad faith must be specific to the Complainant, or at very least that the Respondent must have “had the Complainant in mind” when he registered the Domain Name. The ordinary and natural meaning of “primary” is foremost, of first rank of importance or value. This implies that there is no other overriding or principal purpose or intention. From the evidence before me, the Respondent did not register the disputed domain name with the primary intention of selling it to someone like the Complainant.\r\n\r\nIn relation to the Respondent’s  intention to attract Internet users for commercial gain the Complainant produced in evidence screen shots of the website indicating links to competing sites. \r\nIn its defence, the Respondent explains that the page in question was a parking page.\r\n\r\nThe question is whether this explanation is credible. There is then the question as to whether I should accept it.\r\n\r\nRegarding credibility, the matter is once again evenly balanced. In my view an answer lies in the screen shot provided by the Complainant. The URL at the foot of the screen shot indicates the web page was being hosted under the domain name that corresponds to the Respondent’s evidence. Thus I find that there is some acceptable corroboration for the Respondent’s explanation\r\n\r\nAs to whether I can accept the explanation, the Complainant, in its Rejoinder, robustly submits that I cannot: the Respondent, it states, must be held accountable for content on web pages that resolve to a domain name under its control; and that to allow a Respondent to abdicate its responsibility would bring the whole ADR system into disrepute.\r\n\r\nI find that the operative word employed in the bad faith case in issue is intentionally. The case is only made out if the domain name was “intentionally” used to attract Internet users, for commercial gain, etc. Since evidence of some actual or apparent intention is required, as a matter of interpretation therefore, I find that the case does not impose a standard of strict liability, which would follow if the Complainant’s line was adopted. \r\n\r\nThus, on the balance of probabilities I cannot find that the domain was or is being used with the intention of attracting users for commercial gain.\r\n\r\nThe Complainant’s complaint is denied.",
    "decision_domains": [],
    "panelist": null,
    "panellists_text": null
}